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
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS:
AN ANALYSIS OF SOURCING A COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE
CAPABLE OF EXECUTING FORCED ENTRY CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

Michael L. Hennen, MAJ USA
B.A., Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, 1979



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1993

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE


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Name of candidate: Major Michael L. Henchen

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
Approved by:

 LTC USA Thesis Committee Chairman
LTC Gerard J. Murgia, M.A.

 Member
James H. Willbanks, M.S., M.A., M.M.A.S.

 Member, Consulting Faculty
LTC James E. Swartz, Ph.D.

Accepted this 4th day of June 1993 by:

 Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (Reference to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS:
AN ANALYSIS OF SOURCING A COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE
CAPABLE OF EXECUTING FORCED ENTRY CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
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Conclusions reached as a result of this study point to the need to permanently establish a single joint task force headquarters which can serve as a rapidly expanded nucleus for the designated JTF commander. This finding echoes that of the Holloway Commission's 1980 report on the failure of the Iranian hostage rescue which found that an existing JTF organization, even if it were small and had few permanent members assigned, would provide an organization with the required expertise which could serve as the nucleus for a larger force upon activation.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Primary Research Question

The current downsizing of the American military and the move toward basing the majority of our forces in the Continental United States (CONUS) makes it imperative that we remain postured to respond to a variety of global contingencies. In today's ever-changing world the political climate demands that the U.S. maintain forces capable of planning and executing successful joint contingency operations which require forced entry. The ability to rapidly alert, deploy, and employ these forces is not an inherent trait, but rather a skill that must be attained and maintained on the part of any potential joint task force staff. With this in mind, we must remain focused on maintaining the capability to execute successful joint forced entry contingency operations led by a deployable joint task force (JTF) that is staffed with personnel who understand the complexities of joint operations and who have worked with each other on a continual basis. In an effort to address these requirements, this thesis poses the following question: Should a permanent Joint Task Force

headquarters be organized to execute all U.S. military forced entry contingency operations?

The dilemma that faces U.S. military leaders is how to attain and subsequently maintain the unique capability to conduct short or no-notice forced entry force projection operations in an environment of expanding missions and force reductions. The drastic reductions in the force structure, which include the staffs of unified commands, are beginning to limit the amount of flexibility that the unified commanders in chief (CINC's) have to respond to regional crises. Add to these reductions the expanding mission profiles for the CINC's (counter drug, humanitarian, etc.), and the unified commanders are faced with the prospect of doing much more with significantly fewer resources. This problem is compounded by the decision to withdraw the majority of our forward deployed forces and base them within CONUS. This trend will ultimately result in a loss of response capability within a potential theater of operations and a much greater reliance on simultaneous deployment and employment operations of CONUS based forces.

The CINC's of the warfighting unified commands face a difficult challenge in executing their responsibilities. The decreasing presence of U.S. forces in their assigned areas of responsibility (AORs) and continually shrinking personnel and equipment resources will hamper their ability to react to regional crises. This degradation in

effectiveness will be most apparent during contingency or NOPLAN options where there is likely to be limited time to plan the operation and then project the required force into theater. This contrasts with a situation that develops over time which allows sufficient time for deliberate planning and staging of the required combat power. A recent example of these two scenarios can be found by contrasting Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait demanded an immediate response which was satisfied by the rapid deployment of the 82d Airborne Division and follow-on forces during DESERT SHIELD. The operation was successful as it served as an immediate deterrent for Iraq not to invade Saudi Arabia. DESERT STORM, however, was an operation initially conceived under the deliberate planning process. This allowed sufficient time to deploy the required combat power into theater prior to the operation commencing.

The majority of the CINC's currently have some type of deployable joint task force staff built into their organizational structure. These organizations will be discussed, in detail, later in this paper. The objective of this paper is to determine what type of joint task force staff can best achieve the mission for the CINC if he has to execute a NOPLAN or contingency forced entry operation.

Secondary Research Questions

In order to ensure that any conclusions reached in respect to the primary question are valid, it is critical that several secondary questions be considered. First of these is: What technical and tactical expertise/capability is required of a contingency JTF staff to successfully execute forced entry operations? The answer to this question will provide a framework from which to ultimately answer the primary thesis. Its importance lies in the identification of exactly what expertise and capabilities are required. For example, if war planners envision that the contingency JTF staff must have the capability to airdrop its personnel and equipment, then the resource requirements become substantially more involved than if that capability were not needed. Additionally, it is critical that specific requirements such as special operations force (SOF) expertise, amphibious expertise, airborne expertise, space expertise, etc., be identified as all of these capabilities have a cost associated with them.

Given this framework, the next question that must be considered is: What contingency JTF structures currently exist within the unified commands? Here it is important to not only determine existing structures but also to consider how they are exercised and resourced. The fact that a contingency joint task force (CONJTF) staff may be specifically identified on a joint table of distribution

(JTDA) may not necessarily mean that it is totally dedicated to performing that mission. There is a tremendous difference between a staff that is entirely focused on exercising and executing its function for contingency operations and a staff that performs those same functions on a part-time or a "time permitting" basis. By "dual hatting" staff personnel, the tendency is to concentrate on the area drawing the most heat or visibility at that particular time. While the "hot area" may indeed be some type of contingency operation, it is more likely to be the daily routine area such as a counter drug operation, or some type of civic action military operation in a particular country within the region. Some may argue that this type of organization currently exists in the form of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). While it is certainly true that JSOC possesses a tremendous capability to command and control forced entry operations, its specialized mission orientation somewhat restricts its use.

Once the above questions are answered, the next question that must be considered is: Given unlimited resources, should each warfighting unified command have its own contingency JTF staff? While it is doubtful that an unlimited resource environment will exist in the future, this question is important as it provides a "best case" scenario which can be used as a comparison to the primary research question. The research will demonstrate how

several of the unified commands (i.e. USLANTCOM), have in fact developed and resourced a semblance of a deployable JTF which in theory could command and control a forced entry operation.

Working from this framework, the final question that must be considered is: Given limited resources, what is the most efficient system to source contingency JTF staffs which are capable of planning and executing forced entry operations? The answer to this question will be somewhat difficult to determine, as a comparison and contrast of the different trade-offs in resources and expertise will be required.

The answers to these four secondary questions will provide the background required to provide some type of conclusion to the thesis. Conversely, however, it is entirely possible that the research will show only a set of conditions under which the thesis is validated. In other words, given a specific crisis in a specific region, it may be possible for the staff of the theater CINC to effect a successful conclusion without outside staff augmentation. On the other hand, given an entirely different crisis within the same region, the CINC may in fact require staff resources that are not available from within his assets.

Assumptions

The following assumptions must be made in support of this thesis:

1. Future U.S. military operations will be predominantly joint in nature and will likely warrant some manner of coalition warfare.

2. U.S. military forces will be required to execute crisis action deployment/employment operations in response to a variety of worldwide contingencies.

3. The current downsizing of U.S. military forces will decrease the personnel resources of the Unified CINC's.

4. U.S. military forces will be required to conduct forced entry operations pursuant to successful crisis resolution.

Definition of Terms

A Joint Staff. The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command or of a joint task force that includes members from the several services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that service representation and influence generally reflect the service composition of the force.

(AFSC Pub 1)¹

Airhead. A designated location in a hostile or threatened territory which, when seized and held, ensures the continual airlanding of troops and material and

furnishes the maneuver space needed for projected operations. (AFSC Pub 1)²

Air Movement. Air transport of units, personnel, supplies, and equipment, including airdrops and air landings. (Joint Pub 1-02)³

Alert Status. The level of preparedness directed by competent authority to be attained by deploying units. (AFSC Pub 1)⁴

Allocation. The resources furnished to the commander of a unified or specified command by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for execution planning or actual execution. (AFSC Pub 1)⁵

Beachhead. A designated area on a hostile shore that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and material, and furnishes maneuver space for subsequent projected operations ashore. (Joint Pub 1-02)⁶

Close-Hold Access. Extremely limited availability of OPLAN information to specific personnel and terminals at WWMCCS sites as the plan is being developed. (AFSC Pub 1)⁷

Combatant Command (COCOM). Exercised only by commanders of unified and specified combatant commands, COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform the functions of command over assigned forces that involve organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint

training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM gives full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. COCOM includes the authority of OPCON. (AFSC Pub 1)⁸

Command, Control, and Communications Systems (C3S).

The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces to accomplish assigned missions. (Joint Pub 1-02)⁹

CONPLAN. An operation plan in concept format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. (AFSC Pub 1)¹⁰

Contingency. An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (JCS Pub 1-02)¹¹

Contingency Plan. A plan for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic subareas of a command. (Joint Pub 1-02)¹²

Crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops

rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of United States military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (Joint Test Pub 5-0)¹³

Crisis Action Procedures. A system specified in Joint Pub 5-02.4 that gives guidance and procedures for joint operation planning by military forces during emergency or time-sensitive situations. The procedures are designed to give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information to develop timely recommendations to the National Command Authorities for decisions involving the use of United States military forces. (AFSC Pub 1)¹⁴

Deliberate Planning. Operational planning tasks as assigned by JSCP or other directive and performed using procedures outlined in Joint Pubs 5-02.1, .2, and .3. (AFSC Pub 1)¹⁵

Joint Doctrine. Fundamental principles issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. (AFSC Pub 1)¹⁶

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The system that forms the foundation of the U.S. conventional command and control system consisting of policies, procedures, and reporting systems supported by automation used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization,

deployment, employment, and sustainment activities in peace, exercises, crisis, and war. (AFSC Pub 1)¹⁷

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP conveys strategic guidance, including apportionment of resources, to the CINCs and the Chiefs of Services, to accomplish assigned strategic tasks based on military capabilities existing at the beginning of the planning period. The JSCP offers a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice to the NCA. (AFSC Pub 1)¹⁸

Joint Table of Distribution (JTDA). A manpower document which identifies the positions and enumerates the spaces that have been approved for each organizational element of a joint activity for a specific year (authorization year) and those spaces which have been accepted for planning and programming purposes for the four subsequent fiscal years. (JCS Pub 1-02)¹⁹

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP). The actions and methods which implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They will be promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called JTTP. (JCS Pub 1-02)²⁰

Joint Task Force. A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy and/or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, that is constituted by the Secretary of Defense or by the

commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command or an existing joint task force. (AFSC Pub 1)²¹

Limited Access. Selected access to OPLAN data granted to designated personnel and specific WWMCCS terminals. (AFSC Pub 1)²²

Lodgement Area. A designated area in a hostile territory that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous and uninterrupted landing by air or sea of troops and material and offers necessary maneuver space for subsequent projected joint operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)²³

Noncombatant Evacuees. DOD-sponsored personnel, Department of State personnel, other U.S. Government-sponsored personnel, and U.S. citizens and designated aliens who must be removed from a threatened geographic area or theater of operations. (AFSC Pub 1)²⁴

NOPLAN. A contingency for which no operation plan has been published. (AFSC Pub 1)²⁵

Special Operations. Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized DOD forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national objectives. Conducted during either hostilities or peace, they can support conventional operations, or they may be prosecuted independently when conventional force is inappropriate or infeasible. (Joint Pub 1-02)²⁶

Supported Commander. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other authority. The term also refers to the commander who originates operation plans in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (AFSC Pub 1)²⁷

Supporting Commander. A commander who furnishes augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. (AFSC Pub 1)²⁸

Unified Command. A command with a broad and continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Services. (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02)²⁹

Limitations

The primary limitation of this study concerns the future organization of U.S. military forces. The current FY 95 endstate is fairly well defined. However, this endstate is a product of the former Bush Administration which may change significantly under the current Clinton Administration. Adding to this potential re-definition of national military strategy and structure is General Colin Powell's recent proposal for a change in the Unified Command structure which proposes that USLANTCOM assume responsibility for deployment of all contingency forces.

While any changes will not be fully articulated for several months, one can safely proffer that any changes will involve decreases in force structure vice increases.

While this limitation may ultimately decrease the study's validity in the mid to long term, it will not have a major effect on its near term utility. For example, while the Clinton Administration may decrease the number of geographically oriented unified commands, this process will ultimately take some time to accomplish. Furthermore, any additional reductions may in fact make the thesis conclusion stronger.

Delimitations

The primary delimitation involves the decision to keep this study unclassified. While there are many classified sources that can be used to support this study, the difficulty of working within the classified arena precludes their use. This is especially true in the area concerning inter-operability between conventional and special operation forces in a forced entry contingency operation. Many conventional contingency operations are preceded by some manner of covert operations and in some cases actually occur as a result of a covert operation. (Some JSOC operations could fall into this category.)

The second delimitation concerns the contingency operations selected for inclusion in the study. In an effort to limit the scope of the study, 1962 is used as the

starting point for choosing operations to discuss. Additionally, I have not considered the operations which occurred during the conduct of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM as these operations do not satisfy the definition of forced entry.

Significance of Study

There are numerous published studies that focus on command and control of forces during armed conflict. While these works have provided insights and new approaches into the command of large joint forces, few have dealt specifically with joint contingency operations which require a forced entry as a prelude to follow-on employment operations. This study will attempt to fill that void by concentrating exclusively on what is required to successfully execute this type of fast paced, rapidly executed mission.

There will be some critics who will assert that a study of JUST CAUSE is all that is necessary to answer the thesis question. While the success in Panama is certainly indicative of some level of joint task force staff expertise, one should not get swept away in the euphoria of the afterglow. The fact is that U.S. military forces were provided over two years to fine tune the plan and conduct numerous rehearsals. As a result, it is difficult to define JUST CAUSE as a typical contingency operation.

This study will focus more on the Dominican Republic or Grenada type operations and the joint staff organization and expertise required for successful execution of a situation with limited planning and execution time. With this type of concentration, valid conclusions will be reached in respect to dealing with "worst case" scenarios.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Contingency Joint Task Forces - An Historical Perspective

An examination of several historical applications of joint task forces in a crisis action environment is important to this study as it provides a series of baselines from which to compare and contrast existing structures. While one can argue that these applications can be traced back further than 1960, in an effort to limit the scope of this paper, this study will consider only those occurring from 1962 to the present.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

The first operation to be considered involves U.S. reaction to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Military historian, Jonathan House, describes this event as the largest contingency operation of the Cold War.³⁰ While this operation never reached the planned endstate (the invasion of Cuba), initial deployment operations did take place with a joint task force staff developed to command the operation.

The initial command architecture for the operation consisted of several joint task forces (Figure 1).

Headquarters, Second Fleet, acting as JTF 122, would control the amphibious phase of the operation. XVIII Airborne Corps, acting as JTF Cuba, would assume control of all follow-on operations once all the landings were completed. The Commander in Chief Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) would exercise direct control of the task forces throughout the operation.³¹

Less than one month later, however, the command structure was changed significantly (Figure 2). Rather than having a joint commander in the tactical area of operations, capable of coordinating all the services' efforts, CINCLANT would control combat operations directly through his component headquarters.³² Had this operation been fully executed, the forced entry aspect most assuredly would have met with disaster without an on-scene commander.

Operation POWER PACK: United States
Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966

On 26 April 1965, elements of the 82d Airborne Division were placed on alert for possible deployment to the Dominican Republic. The crisis had been precipitated by chaos within the country that was considered to have the potential to place American citizens in an untenable position. Two days later, as the situation deteriorated, a force of 536 U.S. Marines landed in the Dominican Republic to ensure the safety of U.S. citizens and assist in their evacuation. The Marine employment was followed on 30 April

by the deployment of two battalion combat teams from the 82d Airborne Division and Major General Robert York, the division commander.

To describe the command and control structure in place during the initial deployment as chaotic and confusing is an understatement. Much of this confusion resulted from the complicated and unwieldy command relationships which existed during that timeframe between service components, unified commands, and U.S. Strike Command (Figure 3). It is interesting to note that this same architecture was in place during the aforementioned Cuban missile crisis and resulted in the same level of confusion. Historian Dr. Lawrence Yates best describes the situation:

When evaluating the preparations that took place for the military intervention between the time Army and Air Force units received alert notification on 26 April and the attainment of DEFCON 2 status by two airborne BCTs on the 29th, contemporary participants and later historians agree that what transpired hardly represented a textbook model for joint operational planning. Chain of command violations, conflicting priorities, escalating requirements, equipment and personnel shortages, coordination difficulties, outdated OPLANS, and inadequate and inaccurate intelligence: all presented problems with which commanders and their staffs had to contend. Long hours and diligent staff work overcame many of these obstacles; others persisted well into the intervention. Some of the general problems that the military encountered during the preparatory phase of the crisis continue to arise in joint contingency operations today.¹³

The command and control situation did not significantly improve after force closure. During the period 30 April through 7 May, there were no less than four

distinctly different command structures in place (Figures 4 thru 7). Compounding these problems was a lack of capability on the part of the separate task forces to fully assume their designated responsibilities. For example, when Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, then the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), deployed on 1 May, his mission was to assume the role of a theater commander. However, he did not have the communications capability in country to effectively execute the mission. As a result, he could not communicate with the Navy elements and eventually had to jury rig a system in order to communicate with General Earle Wheeler at the JCS.³⁴

The stage had been set, once again, for a potential disaster. The fact that the military forces were able to eventually achieve their mission is more a testament to hard work and a little luck than to any appreciable level of joint expertise. As in the Cuban example, operations were once again conducted in a "make it up as you go along" manner.

Operation URGENT FURY:
United States intervention in Grenada, 1983

At 0454 hours on Saturday, 22 October 1983, the JCS issued the Execute Order for URGENT FURY to Admiral Wesley McDonald, the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command.³⁵ This order set in motion the first true contingency operation since the 1965 Dominican Republic intervention. While U.S.

forces ultimately achieved their missions in Grenada, the efficiency and joint expertise evidenced during the operation left much to be desired. The lack of inter-operability between special operations and conventional forces, the inability for committed forces to communicate across the entire joint spectrum, and the lack of joint staff expertise all contributed to the problems encountered during the prosecution of URGENT FURY

Operation URGENT FURY visibly demonstrated the deficiencies which existed in U.S. joint warfare doctrine and training. During a 1987 briefing with Lieutenant General Merrill McPeak (now the Air Force Chief of Staff), Lieutenant General John Foss (now General, Retired) described these joint execution shortfalls as "a failure of Joint Operations 101."³⁶

Of the three factors noted above, it appears that the lack of joint staff expertise remains the most significant. The joint task force for the operation was assembled in such a short amount of time that there was virtually no opportunity to work out joint tactics, techniques and procedures prior to execution. The absence of any previously published joint procedures (at least at the operational and tactical level) exacerbated the problem.

The problems first began with the decision to eliminate the joint headquarters responsible for that region, U.S. Forces Caribbean, from the operation. What is

even more ironic is that OPLAN 2360, the only contingency plan which existed pertaining to operations in Grenada, specifically called for U.S. Forces Caribbean to have overall command of the operation. This OPLAN was never activated nor was it even discussed during the initial planning sessions.³⁷ It seems that some of the same OPLAN problems found during the POWER PACK operation were being repeated seventeen years later.

While the command structure for the operation was significantly smoother than those used during the 1960's (Figure 8), the level of expertise on the part of the joint task force staff was abysmal. Admiral McDonald activated Joint Task Force 120 and appointed Vice-Admiral Joseph Metcalf as its commander. The problems Metcalf faced with his ad-hoc staff were enormous. Retired British Major Mark Adkin describes the situation as follows:

To supplement Metcalf's naval team, a seventeen-man joint "fly away" staff was assembled. This group would fly out with the commander of JTF 120 to establish an operational headquarters on the USS Guam. It was all very rushed, with most officers never having worked together before. The short time frame also limited the army and air force representation. (Lack of staff who understood how to plan and coordinate joint fire support programs for ground forces on the island, by aircraft or naval gunfire, was an omission later much regretted.)³⁸

While expertise concerning service specific capabilities was certainly available, consolidating this expertise in a timely manner proved to be difficult. The first joint planning conference that Admiral McDonald was

able to convene on October 22 was significant in the number of key players who were represented in either a cursory manner or not represented at all. For example, Air Force Brigadier General Robert Patterson, the representative from the Air Force's Military Airlift Command (MAC), never made it to the meeting. Marine Corps, Special Operations Forces, and Army representation consisted primarily of lieutenant colonels and more junior officers.³⁹ This lack of representation in the most critical of planning sessions resulted in many key units playing "catch-up" for most of the operation and exacerbated the problem of integrating all of these units into a cohesive joint military force.

Lessons learned from URGENT FURY not only focused on establishing the much needed joint techniques, tactics, and procedures, but also identified the dangers commiserate with untrained joint staffs.

Operation JUST CAUSE:
The United States Invasion of Panama, 1989

In the late evening hours of 19 December 1989, more than eighteen months of planning reached a culmination as forces of the United States military initiated Operation JUST CAUSE. Less than two months later, with Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega in custody and the legitimate government of Panama restored, the last of the deployed combat forces returned to the United States. Twenty-three U.S. servicemen were killed and 324 were wounded during the

conflict which has been described as a textbook example of how to successfully execute a joint contingency forced entry operation.⁴⁰ If this was truly a flawlessly executed operation, then the question must be asked: what was present during JUST CAUSE that was not present during URGENT FURY that paved the way for such success?

First, and most important of all, the command architecture for the operation was clearly delineated well before the execution. This is not to say that there were not instances in the early planning stages where the proposed command and control relationships failed to follow the tenets of simplicity and unity of command. In early 1988, verbal debates were still being waged between XVIII Airborne Corps, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), and U.S. Army South (USARSO) as to who was going to control the battle at what time. Indeed, the plan proposed during this timeframe called for numerous battle handovers between the different commands in the first forty-eight hours of execution.⁴¹

It wasn't until September 1989, when General Maxwell Thurman assumed command of USSOUTHCOM, that the command architecture for the operation began to be streamlined. It was during this period that General Thurman passed the responsibility for the Panama plan to Lieutenant General Carl Stiner, commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps:

Carlos, I've talked to the chief and I've talked to the chairman, and you are my man for everything that has to be done there. I'm putting you in charge of all forces and you've got it: planning, execution, the whole business. I have looked at my staff and I have told the chairman and I have told the chief that it cannot run a contingency operation. He said you can have it and I'm holding you responsible.⁴²

The second main difference between URGENT FURY and JUST CAUSE concerns the expertise of the JTF staff. Armed with both the responsibility and the authority to command what eventually became JTF South, Stiner was able to draw upon lessons learned from a series of joint exercises conducted with 12th Air Force and Military Airlift Command (MAC) known as SAND EAGLES. SAND EAGLES were close-hold, no-notice, joint contingency exercises designed to train and evaluate participating forces' abilities to successfully plan and execute joint forced entry operations. An integral part of the exercises was the formation of a JTF staff to command and control the operations. Composition of the JTF staff included personnel from XVIII Airborne Corps, 12th Air Force, MAC, JSOC, and other Special Operations Forces (SOF). The SAND EAGLE series provided an opportunity for the staff to coalesce into an efficient, integrated force. Tactics, techniques, and procedures across the entire operational spectrum were tested, refined, and eventually adopted. Most important of all, personnel from the diverse range of units were afforded the opportunity to become familiar not only with each other but also with the capabilities of all

participating units.⁴³ Similar exercises known as PURPLE STORMS and SAND FLEAS served the same purposes for those units already stationed in Panama. As a result, when these personnel met in December 1989 to execute JUST CAUSE, the proverbial "mating dance" had been accomplished and the staff focused entirely on the mission at hand.

Organization and Expertise Requirements of
Joint Task Force Staffs

Largely as a result of the joint operational failures exhibited during URGENT FURY, the United States Congress began a move to effect what was considered to be much needed reform in the joint military establishment. These efforts culminated in 1986 in the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Commonly known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, this statute delineates the responsibilities of the joint military community and provides for greater vested power in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The act also directs the establishment of programs to ensure that the best qualified officers from each of the services are trained and utilized in joint responsibilities:

The Secretary of Defense shall establish policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps on the active-duty list who are particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters . . . officers to be managed by such policies, procedures, and practices are referred to as having, or having been nominated for, the "joint specialty" An officer who is nominated for the joint specialty not be selected for the joint specialty until the officer successfully completes an appropriate program at a

joint professional military education school and after completing such program of education, successfully completes a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment."

As a result of this Act, the JCS revised several existing publications and promulgated numerous others in an attempt to precisely define the roles and responsibilities of the separate services, the combatant commands, the JCS, and the CJCS in relation to joint military operations. These publications fill the void which existed in respect to joint techniques, tactics and procedures. In effect, they have provided a baseline for the execution of joint operations across the operational continuum.

Joint Pub 3-56 (Initial Draft), Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations specifically "sets forth performance of the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by commanders of combatant commands and joint force commanders and prescribes command and control doctrine for joint operations and training." By addressing specific areas such as airspace control, forcible entry operations, and the role of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), to name a few, this document ensures a point of reference for command and control of joint operations.

JCS Pub 5-00.2 (Test Pub) Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures "establishes joint planning guidance and procedures for forming, staffing, deploying, employing, and redeploying a joint task force for short-

notice contingency operations."⁴⁶ This document provides the joint planner and executor the requisite guidance to successfully meet the contingency JTF mission. Its focus on standard JTF HQ Staff organization (Figure 9) and sample JTF command relationships (Figure 10) provides a common thread for the joint planner.

There are numerous other documents in this series that support the conduct of joint operations. Many of these are discussed in much greater detail with specific applications in Chapter 3.

Summary

While certainly not all-encompassing, this chapter has attempted to describe the evolution of joint contingency forced entry operations from our initial efforts in the 1960's to our most recent success in Panama. The intent was not to provide an in-depth analysis, but rather to provide an historical perspective of our failures and successes. This perspective highlights various evolutionary aspects of the ability of United States' military forces to plan and execute joint contingency operations. The common thread that seems to be woven through both the successes and failures primarily is focused on the requirement for a solid, but simple, command and control structure manned with the requisite degree of joint expertise. Additionally, this perspective has identified some of the degradation that occurs when a joint task force headquarters, charged with

planning and executing joint operations, is rapidly formed in an "ad hoc" nature. Specific analysis as to the effect, if any, that a permanent JTF HQ Staff might have had on these past operations will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research for this project centers around two primary areas: First, an examination of what capability is required of a joint task force staff executing forced entry operations, and secondly, what aspects of this capability currently exist or are currently proposed.

Capabilities Required of a JTF Staff Executing Forced Entry

The methodology used to determine what capabilities are required of a joint task force staff focuses on After Action Reports (AARs) from joint exercises/operations, inputs into the Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS), and a critical analysis of required joint expertise.

After Action Reports

DESERT ONE

DESERT ONE, the 1980 aborted operation to free U.S. hostages in Iran, illustrates (although from the perspective of "how not to") some of the capabilities required to successfully execute joint forced entry operations. While a large portion of the official AARs from this operation

remain classified, there are several published documents that point out specific joint expertise shortcomings which ultimately contributed to the failure of the operation. In May 1980, the Department of Defense sanctioned a commission under the chairmanship of former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III. The mission of this organization was to investigate the planning and execution of DESERT ONE and recommend changes to the current doctrine.⁴⁷ Of the twenty-three major issues that the Holloway Commission's report concluded contributed to the mission's failure, the following nine can be linked to some degree of unfamiliarity with both the expertise required of an operational joint task force staff and the requisite knowledge of separate services capabilities:

1. Excessive operational security
2. Organization, Command and Control
3. Intelligence
4. Plan review
5. Readiness Evaluation
6. Joint Training
7. Alterations in JTF Composition
8. Alternate Helicopter Pilots
9. Command and Control at Desert One⁴⁸

Several of these issues can be combined under one specific finding. For example, the problem with excessive operational security can be directly tied to the fact that the Joint Task Force was not efficiently organized. To fully understand how these problems evolved and identify what capabilities this particular joint task force staff required but did not possess, it is important to

discuss the manner in which this JTF was organized and its subsequent mission planning process.

On November 4, 1979, weeks of civil unrest in Iran culminated in the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the seizure of 98 U.S. hostages. Despite the chaos leading up to this event, there had been no formation of a JTF staff to track the crisis. As a result once the hostage situation occurred, a complete staff had to be assembled. Urgency notwithstanding, it wasn't until November 12, 1979, nine days into the crisis, when the appointed JTF Commander, Major General James Vaught, arrived from Germany, that the JTF staff began to form. Even at this late date, this was a skeleton staff. It would be days before the staff could be beefed-up with the personnel required."

Many of the Holloway Commission's findings point to the use of ad hoc arrangements during the planning and rehearsal stages of the operation:

By not utilizing an existing JTF organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to start, literally, from the beginning to establish a JTF, find a commander, create an organization, provide a staff, develop a plan, select the units, and train the forces before attaining even the most rudimentary mission readiness.

An existing JTF organization, even with a small staff and only cadre units assigned, would have provided an organizational framework of professional expertise around which a larger tailored force organization could quickly coalesce.

The important point is that the infrastructure would have existed--the trusted agents, the built-in OPSEC, the secure communications. At a minimum, COMJTF would have had a running start, and could

have devoted more hours to plans, operations, and tactics rather than to administration and logistics.⁵⁰

The Holloway Commission's report eventually led to the formation of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) which now possesses the capabilities and expertise addressed above. However, as previously addressed in Chapter One, this organization's specific mission profile precludes its use in most conventional forced entry operations.

SAND EAGLES

As briefly discussed in Chapter Two, the SAND EAGLE series of exercises was the result of initiatives on the part of XVIII Airborne Corps, Twelfth Air Force, and the Military Airlift Command (now called the Air Mobility Command). The exercises were designed to exercise and evaluate the ability of the three major units and their subordinate forces to successfully plan and execute joint contingency forced entry operations within the framework of the JCS Crisis Action System. Planning and exercise coordination for the operations were held on a strict "need to know" close hold basis. The objective was to keep the list of those "read in" on the exercise as short as possible in order to ensure realistic conditions for the participants. This differs from many joint exercises such as OCEAN VENTURE and SOLID SHIELD. Although advertised as crisis action vehicles, these JCS sponsored exercises often fail to realistically portray crisis planning.

SAND EAGLE 88-1

As the SAND EAGLE series evolved, it became evident that a JTF headquarters and staff needed to be formed to command and control the exercise. (Early SAND EAGLEs met this requirement by using a Joint Exercise Control Group to play the role of the JTF.) SAND EAGLE 88-1 was the first in the series to test the ability of the participating units to form a JTF:

SAND EAGLE 88-1 was a composite force, joint training exercise intended to provide valuable training in the Crisis Action System by responding to a rapidly developing crisis. A major objective of the exercise was the employment of the Contingency Joint Task Force (CON-JTF) formed between 12th Air Force and the XVIII Airborne Corps. Complete air and ground components participated as if they were under actual tasking, using their full Battle Staffs and forming their AFFOR and ARFOR staffs. Units were notified on a short-notice to execute their response capability. Land based Naval Aviation forces participated even though a component level command was not available. Thus, a total fighting package, from the JTF down to the unit level was exercised.⁵¹

The formation and subsequent execution of command and control activities of the JTF formed for this exercise proved to be somewhat confusing at the outset. With few documented techniques and procedures available to guide them, members of the JTF staff found themselves floundering to not only define their roles in a purely joint environment but also to determine separate service capabilities and requirements. Adding to these problems was the fact that the staff was working against an extremely compressed time

constraint which allowed little time for deliberate actions.⁵²

"SAND EAGLE 88-1 was a demanding exercise: activating component staffs at D-5, flying units at D-3 and airborne units at D-18 hours while requiring JTF and component staffs and commanders to accomplish vital crisis action system functions in a compressed time line."⁵³

The primary lesson learned during the exercise was the uncompromising need for unity of command throughout the JTF organization and the requisite requirement for a communications structure capable of supporting the operation.⁵⁴

SAND EAGLE 89-2

SAND EAGLE 89-2 followed the same basic premise as previous SAND EAGLE exercises: conduct a joint contingency forced-entry operation under crisis action parameters. The joint objectives for this exercise were:

1. Form and exercise JTF-30 (12th AF and XVIII Airborne Corps).
2. Refine the Joint Communication Electronic Operating Instructions (JCEOI).
3. Exercise joint special operations force and conventional force inter-operability/transition.
4. Exercise joint airspace control procedures.
5. Exercise Joint Targeting Board (JTB) procedures.
6. Define procedures and exercise the Joint Movement Control Center (JMCC).
7. Evaluate actual capabilities of existing communications networks.⁵⁵

The force list for this particular exercise was expanded from those of previous SAND EAGLES. Virtually

every unit from XVIII Airborne Corps was involved in the operation. The 7th Infantry Division (Light) was deployed for use as the Opposing Force. The participation of the Joint Special Operations Command provided the JTF staff the opportunity to refine procedures dealing with the interoperability and transition from covert special operations activities to an application of conventional forces.

The scenario was also expanded. The exercise called for the establishment of an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB), with subsequent forced entry operations to seize and secure four Forward Operating Bases (FOB). This expanded range of operations provided an excellent vehicle for evaluating the ability of JTF 30 to control a myriad of operations simultaneously. This training was to prove extremely beneficial nine months later during Operation JUST CAUSE.⁵⁶

Lessons learned at the joint level during this exercise were primarily focused in the areas of unity of command, joint communications, the ability of the JTF staff to sustain operations over a period of time, and the level of expertise within the JTF staff. Although tactics, techniques, and procedures had evolved from previous SAND EAGLE exercises and were relatively well documented, the level of expertise had fluctuated within the staff as a result of personnel transferring out of the participating commands. The transitions ultimately led to a void in

institutional knowledge and resulted in a "learning curve" that had to be overcome in a relatively short time span.

The problems which were observed in the joint communications area were many of the same problems that had plagued joint operations since the early 1980's. The specific observation and subsequent recommendation was that "Air Force and Army communication systems were planned independently which resulted in a poorly integrated communications net. Hence, communications between the two services was severely limited Continue to develop an on-the-shelf JCEOI for use in a USSOUTHCOM contingency. Additionally, recommend communications managers establish a working group on joint operations to better understand each others capabilities/limitations and develop innovative ways to improve joint communication connectivity."⁵⁷

Perhaps the most important lesson learned was the length of time that XVIII Airborne Corps, MAC, and Twelfth Air Force could sustain operations as a JTF staff while simultaneously conducting AFFOR and ARFOR responsibilities. According to Lieutenant General Carl Stiner, who served as both the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander and the Commander, JTF-30 during the exercise ". . . XVIII Airborne Corps and 12th Air Force can form and function as a CONJTF but at a price. At a price of our own operations. We have to split Corps headquarters to do this - half of it goes to the ARFOR and the other half plays CONJTF. We can only do this for a

limited period of time and then it's going to take its toll. Maybe not in 6 hours, maybe a little bit longer and then we are going to have to have some augmentation"58

Lessons learned from the SAND EAGLE series point to the requirement for JTF staffs to be well versed in not only their service specific capabilities, but also those of the other services. Additionally, these exercises identified that joint expertise is transitory in nature -- based on how often and how many key personnel are transferred to other assignments. Finally, and most important of all, these exercises validated that major commands (corps, numbered Air Forces) can function as JTF staffs but only for a limited time and at a cost to AFFOR/ARFOR capability.

Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS)

JULLS is a classified computer database that contains lessons learned from a variety of exercises and operations. Because the entries are non-attributable, reference to a specific entry is not allowed. However, a synopsis of lessons learned without reference to the actual JULLS identification number can be made. As a result of these constraints, this portion of the study will provide a consolidation of JULLS entries as they relate to JTF command and control relationships and expertise required of a JTF staff.

Command and Control

A query of command and control issues identified within the JULLS database provides a recurring theme concerning the lack of unity of command with a resultant lack of unity of joint effort. Entries from URGENT FURY to PROVIDE COMFORT detail many of the same problems in the area of command and control. These issues reveal shortcomings in inter-operability between special operations forces and conventional forces, problems with exchange of liaison officers, and lack of clearly defined lines of command.

Another issue of importance to this study addresses the time link between the initiation of the crisis action system and the designation of a JTF and its commander. Discussion of this issue revolves around the problem of playing "catch-up" that the commander and his staff are faced with once designated. Finally, the lack of inter-operability of the service's communications capability is an issue that does not seem to have improved over time.

Required Expertise

While a review of the JULLS entries concerning joint expertise and training reveals some improvement over time, the number of issues concerning this topic remains rather high. Some issues specifically point to a decline in Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) skills. This decline in capability exists across the entire joint and service spectrum.

Additional expertise shortcomings were identified within a variety of issues. One of most prevalent areas concerns the ineffective use of existing joint structures and assets. For example, URGENT FURY planners were not well versed on the use of the Joint Deployment System (JDS), which ultimately caused confusion when validating airlift requirements. Lack of expertise concerning joint logistics resupply is yet another issue that is repeatedly raised. Finally, the inability to effectively and rapidly build and source force requirements was identified as an issue that requires additional attention.

Joint Expertise Requirements

No one single factor influences the success or failure of a joint operation more than the level of joint expertise of the members of the JTF staff. It is not enough that the personnel fully understand the capabilities of their specific service; a complete awareness of how those capabilities can be integrated into the joint arena must be achieved. Service specific capabilities fully merged with the complementing capabilities of the sister services enhance combat effectiveness which subsequently provide a net sum which is greater than the parts.

Congress recognized this requirement when they drafted and passed the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. In this piece of legislation, Congress charged the service chiefs (i.e. Army Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations, etc.)

with ensuring the combat effectiveness of their service's forces. The commanders of the unified commands and the JCS were given the task of ensuring that those capabilities could be integrated into a synchronized effort during the execution of joint operations.⁵⁹ During joint operations this synchronization effort can be divided into six separate functions: command and control, intelligence, logistics, fires, maneuver and movement, and protection.⁶⁰

Command and Control

In the realm of command and control it is imperative that the JTF staff possess expertise in understanding which organizations and units must be able to communicate with each other. Additionally, it is critical that knowledge concerning communications connectivity is available; not only in which equipment can be connected together but also what time periods specific nets must be operational.⁶¹

Intelligence

Intelligence expertise must be capable of producing products that meet the standards of the seven principles of intelligence quality: timely, objective, usable, ready, complete, accurate, and relevant.⁶² To achieve these standards, the joint intelligence staff section (J6) must be well versed in all aspects of potential threat operations and the possible consequences of those operations on all friendly forces. For example, identification of a threat

air defense system adjacent to an airfield about to be seized by U.S. ground forces provides a variety of threats to the force. While a supporting AC 130 may be above the range of the air defense system, Army helicopters conducting air assault operations and their disembarked troops will most certainly be in range. As a result, it is important that a truly "purple perspective" be attained in the intelligence function.

Logistics

"Operational logistics is one of the major functions performed by joint and combined operational forces in a theater of operations. Operational logistics furnishes the means to support these forces during campaigns and major operations."⁶³ While the importance of efficient logistics structures during joint contingency operations is well documented, this somewhat unglamorous function is often neglected or paid lip service. An analysis of the joint logistics system during URGENT Fury identified the following five issues:

1. Senior commanders underestimated the critical significance of logistics to operational and tactical success on the battlefield.
2. Senior leaders did not appreciate the implications of a joint logistics doctrine that was, at best, vague and contentious.
3. Logisticians were not involved in planning and, as a result, the operation was deficient in critical logistics planning and logistic issues were not considered in the decision-making process.
4. Doctrine was violated and because of that, organizations failed to fight as they had trained.
5. The services had failed to correct longstanding severe incompatibilities in equipment and procedures.⁶⁴

While logistics functions at the tactical level are often a service responsibility, the JTF staff must be able to consolidate and synchronize the service efforts at the operational level to ensure the most efficient use of limited resources. An understanding of each service's needs must include those requirements that are unique and can only be filled and utilized by a specific service, and those requirements that are generic in nature which can be cross leveled across service boundaries.

Fires

"Operational-level fires during conflict revolve around two key considerations: what restraints apply and how joint fires are coordinated The joint coordination process is critical to ensure that resources are not wasted and that fires create a synergistic effect instead of obstacles to the ground force."⁶⁵ Failure to coordinate joint fires often leads to disastrous results,

while a well planned and executed joint fire plan can serve as a tremendous combat multiplier.

A comparison/contrast of URGENT FURY and JUST CAUSE highlights this fact. During the Grenada operation the fire support plan was ineffective. Communications between supporting fire units and the supported units was often non-existent. For example, the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) team which was supporting the 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry was effectively rendered inoperable when it was discovered that it did not possess the required communications codes and frequencies to communicate with the supporting coordination center located on the USS Guam. This lack of capability eventually led to fratricide by an A-7 aircraft on a friendly command post.⁶⁶ Additionally, there were numerous instances where the degree of fire support used was not commensurate with the threat which resulted in unnecessary collateral damage. Contrasting the fire support failures in Grenada is the success of the fire support plan during the Panama operation. Detailed integration of service capabilities into the fire support plan coupled with concise limitations on the use of indirect fires prevented many of the URGENT FURY problems. For example, "howitzer fire required approval from a battalion commander or above, and 105mm guns were used only in direct fire."⁶⁷ All in all, the success of fire support in Panama can be attributed to a more

detailed knowledge of service specific capabilities and the requirements to integrate those assets into a concerted effort. However, it must be noted that despite the improvements in joint fires capabilities and expertise, there were still several cases of joint fratricide during JUST CAUSE.

Movement and Maneuver

"In combat the joint forces commander synchronizes operational movement with operational fires and support efforts to produce a series of operational maneuvers that give the subordinate commanders the leverage needed to gain, retain, or sustain the initiative. At the operational level, the scope and complexity of movement and maneuver require joint and commonly combined operations."⁶⁸ The function of moving and maneuvering joint forces involves operations across the continuum of deployment, employment, and redeployment activities.

While employment operations hold the center stage in the execution of most deliberate plans, the critical aspect of forced entry operations lies in the requirement for simultaneous deployment/employment operations. During most deliberate operations, the decision to transition into employment events is not made until sufficient combat power is available in theater. As a result, unforeseen circumstances such as ship breakdowns, or bad weather at a aerial port of embarkation (APOE) can be more easily

accommodated. This same situation does not exist when executing a forced entry plan. Once the decision to launch is made it is often difficult to stop the process. This is especially true during a synchronized operation that calls for the use of several different APOEs. When one element is able to launch while a follow-on element is forced into a weather delay (as occurred with the 82d Airborne Division during JUST CAUSE) the results can be disastrous.

It is this unique perspective of forced entry operations that demands a level of expertise in joint alternative planning that may not necessarily be required during the execution of a deliberate plan. As a result, JTF staff personnel must be well versed in applying other resources which are available to the joint force commander to fill the temporary deficit in combat power.

Current and Proposed Capabilities

Before delving into what type of JTF structures capable of conducting forced entry operations currently exist or are proposed, it's useful to review the intended purpose of a JTF:

A JTF is established when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. The mission assigned a JTF should require execution of responsibilities involving two or more services on a significant scale and close integration of effort A JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved.⁶⁹

At any given time, there may be several JTF's in existence conducting operations in a variety of locations. For example, at the time of this writing there are three JTF's organized within the United States to conduct counterdrug operations, JTF Full Accounting is operational in the Pacific Command AOR dealing with the Vietnam War MIA/POW issue, and JTF Restore Hope is conducting humanitarian operations in Somalia. With this background in mind, let us look at the structures capable of conducting forced entry operations.

Forced entry JTF capabilities can be broken into three basic categories. There are those that currently exist and are fully capable of executing operations today. There are those that have a planned structure that must be filled upon activation. Finally, there are JTF's that are not planned for which are organized on an "ad hoc" basis as a crisis develops.

Currently, the only organization fully staffed on a day-to-day basis capable of executing forced entry operations is the Joint Special Operations Command. Organized as a result of the failed Iranian hostage rescue mission, JSOC possesses the ability to rapidly respond to crises which may require limited forced entry capability. As previously mentioned in this study, the mission profile

of this organization precludes their use in most conventional forced entry operations. However, the manner in which JSOC is organized and equipped can serve as a model for a rapidly deployable JTF staff.

A variety of structures currently exist throughout the U.S. military that when activated and manned can provide the required capability. While most of these can be found at the unified command level, it is important to mention that major subordinate commands also possess the capability. For example, we have previously discussed how XVIII Airborne Corps and Twelfth Air Force developed a structure for use in contingency operations. This structure served as the foundation for JTF South's composition during the prosecution of JUST CAUSE. However, it is important to remember General Stiner's comment that "we can do it only for a limited period of time . . . and then we are going to have to have some augmentation"70

Several of the unified commands have some type of documented planned structure along with published techniques and procedures to guide the organizations functions. USSOUTHCOM actually has a structure known as the Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF) whose manning requirements are identified in Table 1.

Table 1.--USSOUTHCOM DJTF Joint Table of Distribution⁷¹

<u>Position Title</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Service</u>
Commander	O6	Army
Chief, Personnel	O4	Air Force
Admin Specialist	E4	Army
Chief, Intell	O5	Air Force
Chief, Joint Intell Center Team	O4	Marine
Intell Staff Officer	O4	Air Force
Intell NCO	E7	Army
Chief, Operations	O6	Army
Senior Ground Operations Officer	O5	Army
Senior Air Opns Officer	O5	Air Force
Marine Operations Officer	O5	Marine
Electronic Warfare Staff Officer	O4	Air Force
Special Operations Officer	O4	Army
Naval Operations Officer	O5	Navy
Administration NCO	E8	Army
Operations NCO	E7	Army
Provost Marshall	O5	Air Force
Deputy Chief, Logistics	O4	Air Force
Engineering Officer	O4	Navy
Chief, Operations/Plans	O5	Army
Marine Operations/Plans Officer	O4	Marine
Air Operations/Plans Officer	O4	Air Force
Air Operations Officer	O5	Air Force
Chief, Communications	O5	Army
DJTF Equipment Supervisor	GS	Army
Communication Operations Officer	O4	Army
Communication Control Officer	O4	Air Force

Although the above organization is relatively robust, its primary function is not oriented toward forced entry. Additionally, there has also been a trend to focus the efforts of the DJTF personnel into other areas such as counterdrug activities.

While the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and the U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) do not specifically identify a JTF structure in their JTD, both have published

structures which address the requirement. Of these, USPACOM's is the most detailed and warrants a brief look.

USPACOM's Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) is intended to "provide responsive joint staff expertise in crisis action . . . to a designated Joint Task Force commander and staff. DJTFAC members are integrated fully within the JTF staff."⁷² As a result, this organization provides the augmentation that General Stiner identified as a need early in the operation. Criteria for service on the DJTFAC ensures that personnel have at least one year time on station remaining and that they be knowledgeable not only of service specific capabilities, but also the integration of those assets into joint operations.⁷³ Table 2 illustrates how a typical USPACOM DJTF is constructed.

The final manner in which to source JTF staff requirements concerns the practice of organizing on an "ad hoc" basis. While this practice may sometimes be justified, these organizations have a difficult time in responding to a rapidly escalating crisis where reaction time is at a premium. As a result, this system of sourcing a JTF for forced entry operations is the least desirable.

Table 2.--Typical USPACOM DJTFAC Composition⁷⁴

A. <u>MARITIME OPERATION</u>	B. <u>LAND-BASED OPERATION</u>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Team Chief 2. J1 Personnel Planner 3. J2 Collection Manager 4. IPB Analyst (USA) 5. J3 SORTS Officer 6. J3 JAIS-PAC/ECMC LNO 7. J4 Log Planner 8. J5 Planner (CAP) 9. J6 Comm Planner 10. Fighter Ops (USAF) 11. Airlift Ops (USAF) 12. Airlift PAMO Planner 13. Ground Ops (USA) 14. Amphibious Ops (USMC) 15. SOF Ops (USA or USAF) 16. Intel (USAF) 17. Intel (USA) 18. Intel (USMC) 19. Intel (JICPAC) 20. Log Manager (USAF) 21. Log Manager (USA) 22. Log Manager (USMC) 23. Medical Planner 24. WWMCCS Operator (USCP) 25. WWMCCS Operator (USCP) 26. WWMCCS Operator (Svc) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Team Chief 2. J1 Personnel Planner 3. J2 Collection Manager 4. IPB Analyst (USA) 5. J3 SORTS Officer 6. J3 JAIS-PAC/ECMC LNO 7. J4 Log Planner 8. J5 Planner (CAP) 9. J6 Comm Planner 10. Fighter Ops (USAF) 11. Airlift Ops (USAF) 12. Airlift PAMO Planner 13. Amphibious Ops (USMC) 14. Surface Ops (USN) 15. Naval Air Ops (USN) 16. SOF Ops (USA or USN) 17. Intel (USAF) 18. Intel (USN) 19. Intel (USMC) 20. Intel (JICPAC) 21. Log Manager (USAF) 22. Log Manager (USMC) 23. Log Manager (USN) 24. WWMCCS Operator (USCP) 25. WWMCCS Operator (USCP) 26. WWMCCS Operator (Svc)

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYZING THE REQUIREMENT

The purpose of this chapter is to synthesize the data presented in earlier chapters in order to provide an analytical assessment of the specific requirements identified to this point. Previous chapters examined forced entry operations from the historical perspective of past successes and failures. These chapters also briefly discussed the dynamics which contributed to the operational endstates. This chapter will analyze that data from two different perspectives. The first perspective will focus on the unique nature of the JCS Crisis Action System (CAS) as it relates to the establishment and deployability of a JTF. The second perspective will attempt to answer the question: Given unlimited resources, should each warfighting unified command have its own permanent contingency JTF staff?

CAS and Contingency JTFs

When faced with a developing crisis, U.S. military planners obviously hope that an Operations Plan (OPLAN) or a Concept Plan (CONPLAN), by-products of the deliberate planning process, is available that can be applied to the crisis. The deliberate planning process is a cyclic, five

phase process executed under peacetime conditions which provides an opportunity to develop and refine plans to be used in wartime.⁷⁵ However, many of the crises that develop do not fit into the "mold" of an existing plan. These situations result in initiation of Crisis Action Planning (CAP).

To fully understand key elements of crisis action planning it is first important to understand exactly what constitutes a crisis and its connectivity to CAP:

Crisis is defined within the context of joint operation planning and execution as an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. An adequate and feasible military response to crisis demands a flexible adaptation of the basic planning process that emphasizes the time available, rapid and effective communications, and the use of previously accomplished contingency planning whenever possible.⁷⁶

CAP is broken into six phases:

- a. Situation development
- b. Crisis Assessment
- c. Course of Action Development
- d. Course of Action Selection
- e. Execution Planning
- f. Execution⁷⁷

The dilemma that military planners face is that a crisis often escalates so rapidly that immediate commitment of military forces is required. When this situation occurs, the CAP process has to be truncated, often resulting in less than optimum conditions for employment of U.S. forces. The

1983 operation in Grenada is a prime example of what can happen when this situation occurs. We have seen in Chapter Two how the compressed planning time resulted in an inability to fully develop the specific tactics and procedures required to effectively execute the operation.

When the crisis develops more slowly, the CAP process can be fully implemented. Figure 11 provides a brief sketch of the major functions that are performed during each phase of the process. Of particular note is the establishment of the JTF during Phase III (Course of Action Development). The reference refers to this phase as the optimal time to establish the JTF.

Identifying this phase as the best time in which to establish the JTF is arguable. Granted, if the crisis is developing in a rather slow manner, the newly designated JTF commander and his staff will usually have sufficient time to conduct their critical planning tasks. However, if the establishment occurs during the latter stages of Phase III, the JTF commander and his staff may not have the opportunity to provide input into the COA development. This problem is exacerbated as the speed of crisis escalation increases.

It is interesting to examine some of the reasons proffered for delaying the establishment of the JTF. One such example cautions that "there is potential for JFC [Joint Force Commander] designation to occur prematurely relative to course of action development within the

Commander's Estimate. [The] CINC must ensure that early JFC designation does not slant crisis action planning to a particular service dominant course of action before there has been full evaluation of the assigned mission, including specified and implied tasks."⁷⁸

Putting aside any potential service parochialism, the importance of early JTF designation lies in the "learning curve" that the JTF commander and staff face upon activation. In many cases, this organization will have to begin operations from a cold start, digesting past events and becoming familiar not only with the developing crisis, but also with the different personalities of the JTF.

The problems with late activation are significantly increased when the JTF is pulled together on an ad hoc basis, with no firm foundation of tactics, techniques, and procedures to guide their planning and execution efforts. These problems, coupled with the potential for a critical lack of institutional knowledge, will often lead to either lethargic staff actions or an almost frantic planning pace with a potential for untimely or ill-conceived execution plans. If the JTF staff must forward deploy during this process, the prospects for additional confusion will greatly increase.

Deploying the Contingency JTF

Commanding and controlling a forced entry operation poses several unique problems for the JTF commander and his

staff. A permissive environment allows the establishment of a forward operating base (FOB) from which the JTF staff can operate as they continue to prosecute the operation. Conversely, forced entry operations connote a non-permissive environment which normally precludes the use of a FOB within the area of operations until the initial airhead or beachhead is secured. In either environment, a requirement will likely exist for the JTF staff to forward deploy to the supported theater either prior to initiation of employment operations or early in the employment phase. During Operation JUST CAUSE this deployment was executed just hours before the initiation of hostilities.⁷⁹

Deployment of a JTF staff, while not necessarily a complex affair when viewed as a single event, becomes an extremely complicated mission when executed in the context of a forced entry operation. The myriad of tasks that must be accomplished virtually simultaneously (or at best concurrently), within a compressed timeframe can be overwhelming. One such task is planning for future operations with the requirement to refine courses of action (COA), participate in the COA selection process, and develop and issue the necessary operations orders to the component commands. Another task executed simultaneously concerns the conduct of current operations which involves the early insertion of special operations forces, pre-positioning of aircraft and ships, and constant monitoring of the crisis.

The JTF staff must execute these functions while concurrently preparing for their own deployment into theater. While not complex, these activities are time-consuming, involving such tasks as early deployment of an advance element (usually by commercial means), movement of personnel and equipment to the air or sea port of embarkation (some of which are key to the execution of current operations), and identification and deployment of the airborne or seaborne platform battle staff.

Early activation of the JTF staff provides a solution to most of the dilemmas mentioned above. By initiating operations sooner in the crisis action planning process, the staff has the opportunity to review and refine their tactics, techniques, and procedures at a point in time where the crisis is moving at a slower pace. Even if the crisis escalation is rapid, early activation permits the staff additional planning time that they would not enjoy if they were to be formed late in the process.

Given unlimited resources,
should each warfighting unified
command have its own permanent JTF staff?

In the current military fiscal environment, where both personnel and equipment resources are shrinking, one could argue that this question is a moot point. With force drawdowns occurring within all the services and most of the unified and specified commands, the utility of discussing a utopian condition of unlimited resources is questionable.

However, the answer is quite simply that the best manner in which to determine a given endstate under constrained parameters, is to first determine the optimum solution under unrestricted conditions and then work backwards. By first determining the full range of capabilities that unified command-specific permanent JTF staffs provide, you have a better view of what capabilities are lost when you have to reduce the concept to meet budget and resource constraints.

Allocation of a permanently dedicated JTF staff, capable of forming the nucleus for future execution of contingency forced entry operations to each warfighting CINC, is in fact the solution to correcting the deficiencies identified in earlier chapters. This concept provides the CINC with three major advantages. First, it provides a JTF staff that is regionally focused. Secondly, implementation of a dedicated staff ensures the opportunity for tactics, techniques, and procedures to be developed and continually refined. Finally, a dedicated staff provides a response capability that can meet the most stringent of crisis escalations.

Awareness and understanding of the idiosyncrasies of a particular region are critical assets and in fact can become combat multipliers in dealing with regional crises. The ability to stay abreast of the continual changes within a region with respect to such categories as political structures, clashing religious ideologies, ethnic concerns,

economic problems, and increasing or decreasing military capabilities, ensures that these matters can be integrated into required contingency operations. Additionally, theater oriented DJTFs are more likely to have some language capabilities and regional focus and expertise. While the present system of sourcing JTF staffs provides some of this capability, the potential for a less than optimal integration of these factors into the planned military response exists. Quite simply, those organizations that are tasked to provide staff assets for JTF's under current operation plans do not have the assets (both time and personnel) to fully dedicate their efforts into understanding the influence these factors have in regional crises requiring commitment of military forces.

Earlier chapters have demonstrated how the lack of documented joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) can adversely affect contingency forced entry operations. Reviews of operations such as POWER PACK, URGENT FURY, and DESERT ONE point to not only the need for establishment of JTTPs but just as importantly, a requirement for the personnel executing these functions to possess the expertise to implement the JTTPs under crisis conditions. It is not enough to ensure that the procedures exist. The JTF staff must understand how these functions provide a means to a successful end if correctly integrated into the unique requirements of a particular region.

Forming a JTF staff totally dedicated to preparing for and executing contingency operations in each warfighting unified command ensures that regionally specific JTTPs can be developed and documented. Additionally, since the JTF staff's primary focus is on contingency operations, it can ensure that the primary function of attaining and maintaining expertise in the detailed JTTPs remains a high priority.

Regional expertise, coupled with expertise in the documented JTTPs provides the CINC with a JTF staff that is able to rapidly respond to regional crises. The dedicated JTF staff ensures that the length of any "learning curve" is shortened to the point where under most conditions it will not adversely affect the operation. Additionally, because of its dedicated regional orientation, procedures can be developed to meet the potential deployability requirements of the JTF staff. While these requirements may run the gamut from airdrop to seaborne capability, the nature of the staff organization facilitates these specific needs.

Summary

While a totally dedicated, "full up" JTF staff provides a unified commander with a potent, trained capability to respond to regional crises, its intensive manpower, equipment, and funding resources requirements often precludes its establishment. While the question posed assumed unlimited resources, variations of the above model

can still meet many of the same requirements while decreasing the overall resources needed. One such variation concerns the use of a smaller JTF staff whose focus remains the same as that listed above, but whose use is predicated on utilization as a "nucleus" which can be expanded by the designated JTF commander during the crisis action process. This concept will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Previous chapters of this study have presented an analysis of the following three questions:

1. What technical and tactical expertise/capability is required of a contingency JTF staff to successfully execute forced entry operations?
2. What contingency JTF structures currently exist within the unified commands?
3. Given unlimited resources, should each warfighting unified command have its own contingency JTF staff?

As a result of the data presented, a strong case can be made for the establishment of a permanent joint task force headquarters capable of forming the nucleus for a larger staff charged with executing forced entry contingency operations. This assertion is based on the previous analysis and the following factors: current regional security considerations, limited manpower, equipment, and funding resources as a result of the military drawdown, and

the expertise challenges posed by the unique nature of forced entry contingency operations.

Regional Security Considerations

The demise of the Cold War, while perhaps providing less chance of global war, has unfortunately not led to a major decrease in regional conflicts. In many respects, today's world is more volatile and dynamic as a result of the many regional vacuums created with the breakup of the former Soviet Union. To this end, the United States must continue to increase its ability to rapidly respond to a myriad of regional contingencies by articulating a concise regional defense strategy based on four critical elements. These elements are: strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.⁸⁰

This study has primarily focused on the ability of the military forces of the United States to meet the requirements imposed by the element of crisis response. This particular element of the United States' regional defense strategy:

. . . requires the United States to maintain highly ready and rapidly deployable power projection forces. These forces must be capable of handling regional and local contingencies that vary across the spectrum in size and intensity Power projection forces must also be able to deploy and operate under a broad range of worldwide political and military conditions. These conditions require interoperable, highly responsive, and flexible forces that must be available with little or no warning Effective crisis response imposes stringent requirements on our defense forces We must have the forces necessary to respond

decisively, which requires high-quality personnel and superior military technology that can win quickly with minimal casualties These forces emphasize qualities of versatility, lethality, global deployability, and rapid responsiveness.⁸¹

The key phrases of this quotation center on the capability required for the United States to rapidly project military power with forces that are interoperable and flexible. A permanent JTF headquarters staff satisfies these requirements by ensuring that total concentration is devoted to the dictated endstate of successful deployment and employment of joint forces anywhere in the world on a moment's notice.⁸² The permanency of such an organization and the ability to ensure that it is totally focused on first attaining and then maintaining the ability to respond to regional crisis anywhere in the world provides increased capabilities over current means of resourcing the requirement.

Limited Resources

The fiscally austere environment which currently exists in respect to the United States' military budget is forcing the military into conducting an audit to ensure the best possible utilization of the limited funds that are being made available. Chapter Four discussed the advantages of providing each warfighting CINC with his own permanent JTF staff fully capable of planning and executing forced entry operations. However, remember that the basic assumption of this concept was founded on the premise that

unlimited personnel, equipment, and funding resources were available. Unfortunately this is not the current situation, nor is it projected to be the standard in the future. However, the fact that resources are both limited and shrinking does not cancel the requirement of being able to rapidly deploy military forces and conduct forced entry operations. As a result, it is imperative that other means be developed to ensure that the mission can still be successfully accomplished.

Establishment of a single permanent JTF headquarters staff organized to serve as an expandable nucleus meets this criterion. One major advantage of such an organization is that there is little duplication of effort. If each combatant CINC were to possess this capability on a permanent basis, the United States would possess five times the capability that would be required under most conditions. Inherent in the redundant capabilities is the fivefold increase in personnel, equipment, and funding resources necessary to establish credible capabilities in each of the unified commands.

A tremendous benefit derived from this concept is the quality of personnel, equipment, and funding that can be attained as a result of establishing one organization as opposed to five like organizations. By focusing what limited assets are available into just one organization, it will be possible to ensure that sufficient funding exists to

fully outfit the organization with advanced equipment and an adequate budget to attain and maintain the necessary proficiency. Additionally, the problem of too many personnel slots and not enough qualified personnel will be lessened as the manning requirements are reduced by the corresponding reduction in organizations.

Expertise challenges

The historical examples of contingency operations provided earlier in this study clearly illuminate the unique nature of joint contingency forced entry operations. These same examples also provide a perspective on the expertise required to attain successful endstates and the consequences when that expertise is absent or deficient in some level of specificity.

The recurring theme of the operations studied that were either failures or whose execution was less than optimal is the ad hoc nature inherent in the establishment and staffing of the JTF headquarters executing the operation. In those cases where the JTF headquarters was rapidly thrown together, without a firm foundation of joint tactics, techniques and procedures from which to work, failure was the norm rather than the exception. In many cases, it was only the overwhelming U.S. combat power and the comparatively unsophisticated threat force that provided for a relative success in the operation. URGENT FURY is a prime example of this situation.

The primary deficiency in an organization formed in an ad hoc manner is the inability to ensure that the skills and expertise brought to the organization are commensurate with the task at hand. This problem is exacerbated when the ad hoc organization has to be established quickly with a subsequent rapid execution of its mission. Formation of a permanent JTF headquarters staff solves this dilemma. The permanency of the organization ensures that the required foundation of documented joint tactics, techniques, and procedures are developed, maintained, and continually refined.

An additional benefit derived from a permanent JTF headquarters staff is the institutional knowledge and totally focused effort of the personnel manning the organization. While this study has pointed out several similar organizations that currently exist or are proposed within the unified commands, the question that must be raised is: what is the day-to-day focus of the personnel responsible for staffing the organization during a crisis? In virtually all instances, JTF specific responsibilities are a secondary mission relegated to the "back burner." This point is illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3.--Sourcing Document for PACOM's DJTFAC⁸³

<u>BILLET</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
1. Team Chief	O6	USCINCPAC J30R
2. J1 Personnel Planner	O4-O5	USCINCPAC J1
3. J2 Collection Manager	O4-O5	USCINCPAC J2
4. J3 Training Manager	O4-O5	USCINCPAC J38
5. J3 SORTS	O4-O5	USCINCPAC J34
6. J3 JAIS-PAC/ECMC LNO	E7-O5	USCINCPAC J39
7. J3 Spec Ops Coordinator	O4-O5	USCINCPAC J32
8. J3 Civil Mil Ops Officer	O4-O5	USCINCPAC J32
9. J3 WWMCCS Operator	E5-E7	USCINCPAC J30C
10. Log Planner	O4-O5	USCINCPAC J4
11. CAP Planner	O4-O5	USCINCPAC J54
12. J5 WWMCCS Operator	E5-E7	USCINCPAC J5
13. Comm Planner	O4-O5	USCINCPAC J6
14. J6 WWMCCS Operator	E5-E7	USCINCPAC J6
15. JO6 Staff Judge Advocate	O4-O5	USCINCPAC JO6
16. JO7 Medical Planner	O4-O5	USCINCPAC JO7
17. USAF Airlift Ops Coordinator	O3-O5	PACAF
18. USAF/PAMO Airlift Planner	O3-O5	PACAF
19. USAF Fighter Ops Coordinator	O3-O4	PACAF
20. Intel Officer	O3-O5	PACAF
21. Logistics Mgr, USAF	O3-O5	PACAF
22. WWMCCS Operator	E5-E7	PACAF
23. Surface Ops Coordinator	O3-O5	PACFLT
24. Air Ops Coordinator	O3-O5	PACFLT
25. Intel Officer	O3-O5	PACFLT
26. Logistics Mgr, USN	O3-O5	PACFLT
27. WWMCCS Operator	E5-E7	PACFLT
28. Amphibious Ops Coordinator	O4-O5	FMFPac
29. USMC Air Ops Coordinator	O3-O5	FMFPac
30. Intel Officer	O3-O5	FMFPac
31. Logistics Mgr, USMC	O3-O5	FMFPac
32. Ground Ops Coordinator	O3-O5	USARPAC
33. Intel Officer	O3-O5	USARPAC
34. IPB Analyst	CWO2-O3	USARPAC
35. Logistics Mgr, USA	O3-O5	USARPAC
36. WWMCCS Operator	E5-E7	USARPAC
37. Spec Ops (Air/Gnd)	O3-O5	USARPAC
38. Intel Analyst	O3-O4	USARPAC

This practice of relegating JTF duties to a secondary role results in a major degradation in the maintenance and refinement of the JTTP and the level of expertise of the personnel responsible for manning the JTF

in times of crisis. Compounding the problem are the habitual turnovers that are common to the military.

Recommendations

The ability of United States military forces to successfully respond to contingencies which require forced entry will be enhanced with the establishment of a single, permanent JTF headquarters staff. This staff should be tailored in a manner which allows for the capability to serve as a nucleus for the designated JTF commander which can be rapidly expanded.

The organization should be manned with personnel who are experts on their service specific capabilities and well-versed in the integration of those capabilities into joint forced entry operations. As a result manning should include expertise in amphibious, airborne, aviation, and special forces operations.

This JTF staff should be equipped with the expertise and the equipment to rapidly respond to crisis escalation. Additionally, the organization must possess the inherent capability to quickly and efficiently deploy to the area of operations without suffering a simultaneous degradation in command and control. Personnel and equipment must be able to deploy by a variety of means to include Army aviation, Air Force strategic and tactical airlift (to include airdrop), Navy sealift, and discreet commercial means.

To avoid the impression of any single service parochialism, this organization should be organized as a field activity under the control of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. During joint exercises or an actual crisis situation, the supported unified CINC will exercise combatant command (COCOM) over the staff. This command relationship may require a change in portions of the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986.

Areas for Further Study

The intent of this study was to examine the most efficient way to staff the requirements for JTF staffs that execute forced entry operations. As a result of this focus, little consideration was paid to contingency operations that do not require forced entry. Additional study is required to determine the most efficient manner in which to staff requirements focused on non-forced entry missions such as humanitarian or non-combatant evacuation. A case can be made for the assertion that there is very little difference between the joint expertise required to execute these types of missions and the joint expertise challenges discussed in this study in respect to forced entry operations. The major distinction, however, lies in the non-permissive environment in which forced entry operations are conducted. As a result of this distinction and the unique nature of forced entry operations, care should be taken not to apply this study's

conclusions and recommendations in totality to all forms of contingency operations.

Additional study is also required to expand and develop the specific structure for a permanent JTF staff under the constraints noted above. While this study has presented several versions of deployable JTF's that currently exist or are proposed, it does not address in detail, recommendations concerning the size and specific composition of the organization. The end product of this further study should include such conclusions as the specific manning and equipment required of the organization.

Finally, further study is needed to examine the specific command and control relationships required of a permanent JTF staff. This additional examination should focus on the relationship between the JTF staff and the JCS and include any required changes in existing legislation or statutes that may be necessary. While specific expertise requirements have been identified and discussed throughout this study, it was beyond the scope of the study to identify the specific command architecture required between the permanent JTF, the JCS, and the supported unified commands. Earlier in this chapter a recommendation was proffered to organize the permanent JTF as a field agency under the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. While this is one possible solution to the command and control dilemma, there are certainly others that must be considered. Additional

examination should specifically focus on command and control relationships between the JTF, the JCS, and the unified commands across the continuum of peace and conflict and the manner in which priority of use is determined when more than one unified command is simultaneously engaged.

CHAPTER SIX

EPILOGUE

1993 CJCS Roles and Missions Report

In February 1993, General Colin Powell, in his role as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, issued his report on the roles, missions, and functions of the armed forces of the United States. In this report, General Powell addresses the need to review the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to ensure that within the context of the post Cold War environment, the plan "provides the most effective and efficient command-and-control arrangements for a changing world."⁸⁴

As part of this review, General Powell identifies problems inherent in not having an established joint headquarters to oversee military forces based in CONUS. The focus of these problems deals with the "limited opportunities [of CONUS-based forces] to train jointly with the overseas-based forces they would join for military operations in crisis or war."⁸⁵ Establishment of a joint headquarters would, in General Powell's estimation, allow for more efficient "identification, training, preparation and rapid response of designated CONUS-based forces currently under the Army's Forces Command (FORSCOM), the

Navy's Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT), the Air Force's Air Combat Command (ACC), and the Marine Corps' Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT).⁸⁶

The intent is to consolidate these assets into a combatant command charged with the mission of ensuring the joint training and joint readiness of the military's rapid response forces and developing joint force packages for overseas CINCs. Additional responsibilities proposed include:

Undertaking principal responsibility for support to United Nations peacekeeping operations and training units for that purpose.

Assisting with the response to natural disasters in the United States and other requirements for military support to civil authorities when requested by State Governors and as directed by the President.

Planning for the land defense of CONUS.

Improving joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Recommending and testing joint doctrine.⁸⁷

General Powell's recommendation to fill the identified void and better posture U.S. forces for future contingency operations is to combine the CONUS-based forces of FORSCOM, LANTFLT, ACC, and MARFORLANT into one joint command. The U.S. Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM) is identified as the joint headquarters best suited to assume the mission for this new combatant command. Its proposed responsibilities include: "joint training, force packaging, and facilitating deployments during crisis; supporting UN

peacekeeping operations; and providing assistance during natural disasters."⁸⁸

Avoiding the Mistakes of the Past

Early chapters of this study have discussed several aspects of early command and control structures that posed problems during contingency operations. Many of these problems were focused on the command architecture which existed during those timeframes between the U.S. Strike Command (STRICOM), the Continental Army Command (CONARC), the Air Force's Tactical Air Command (TAC), and the supported unified command. STRICOM was responsible for the joint training of assigned forces. development of joint doctrine and the planning and execution of contingency operations as ordered.⁸⁹ CONARC and TAC were responsible for the training, administration, and doctrine of their respective forces. The unified commanders were responsible for executing operational control over these forces once they arrived in theater in support of an operation.⁹⁰

As was demonstrated during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the intervention in the Dominican Republic, there were often problems in articulating which headquarters had responsibility or authority for assigned units during various phases of the pre-deployment, deployment, employment, and redeployment operations. While not "warstoppers", these problems certainly aggravated the

dilemmas that are normally associated with rapidly deploying forces in response to an escalating crisis.

While times have changed, and the focus of the military's current effort much more joint than in the past, it is critical to ensure that formation of a new variation of the old STRICOM organization is preceded by a clear and concise command architecture. Roles and responsibilities of the new CONUS-based combatant command, the services, and the supported unified command must be clearly delineated if the problems of the past are not to be repeated.

With this in mind, and assuming that the required command architecture is implemented, the permanent JTF headquarters concept discussed in this study could be sourced within the new CONUS-based unified command. By placing the JTF headquarters within this unified command, sufficient focus could be brought to bear on planning and execution of forced entry contingency operations.

ENDNOTES

¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, D.C.: 1 December 1989), 18.

²Armed Forces Staff College, AFSC Pub 1 The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1991), I-1.

³JCS Pub 1-02, 18.

⁴AFSC Pub 1, I-2.

⁵Ibid., I-2.

⁶JCS Pub 1-02, 50.

⁷AFSC Pub 1, I-6.

⁸Ibid., I-6.

⁹JCS Pub 1-02, 77.

¹⁰AFSC Pub 1, I-7.

¹¹JCS Pub 1-02, 86.

¹²Ibid., 86.

¹³Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Test Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C.: 26 July 1991), III-11.

¹⁴AFSC Pub 1, I-8.

¹⁵Ibid., I-10.

¹⁶Ibid., I-17.

¹⁷Ibid., I-17.

¹⁸Ibid., I-19.

¹⁹JCS Pub 1-02, 198.

²⁰Ibid., 199.

²¹AFSC Pub 1, I-20.

²²Ibid., I-20.

²³JCS Pub 1-02, 211.

²⁴AFSC Pub 1, I-24.

²⁵Ibid., I-25.

²⁶JCS Pub 1-02, 339.

²⁷AFSC Pub 1, I-33/34.

²⁸Ibid., I-34.

²⁹JCS Pub 1-02, 384.

³⁰Jonathan M. House, "Joint Operational Problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis," Parameters (Spring 1991) 92.

³¹Ibid., 94.

³²Ibid., 97.

³³Lawrence A. Yates, "Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966," (Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 1988) 64-65.

³⁴Ibid., 109-110.

³⁵Major Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 126.

³⁶This comment was made in 1987 during a briefing the author was presenting to General Foss, then the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps and General McPeak, then the commander of 12th Air Force. The briefing concerned a no-notice, close-hold, joint contingency exercise known as SAND EAGLE. It was during this exercise that the first contingency joint task force headquarters consisting of personnel from 12th Air Force, XVIII Abn Corps, and Military Airlift Command was formed and exercised. In-depth discussions of the SAND EAGLE series of exercises can be found in later chapters of this study.

³⁷Adkin, 126-131.

³⁸Ibid., 127.

³⁹Ibid., 132.

⁴⁰Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama, (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 1991), 390.

⁴¹Concern about the command and control structure for the plan was evident during a planning conference at Bergstrom AFB, TX. General Woerner was convinced that USARSO could handle the responsibility of commanding the JTF for the operation. However, he had caveated this by including the option that they would have control until the scope reached the point where they were no longer able to control the operation. Once this point was reached, command of the JTF would pass to XVIII Airborne Corps. To many of the organizations providing force for the plan (outside of USSOUTHCOM and USARSO), this represented a clear violation of unity of command and simplicity of effort. Donnelly's Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama discusses this problem in detail in Chapters Two and Three.

⁴²Donnelly, Roth, Baker; 55.

⁴³As the primary planner for XVIII Airborne Corps participation in the SAND EAGLE series, I was in an excellent position to observe the evolution of the JTF staff. During the first several iterations of this exercise in 1987 and early 1988, confusion ran rampant. It was not until the 1988 timeframe that the separate service personnel who made up the JTF staff began to work as a truly "purple" staff. That joint perspective combined with documented tactics, techniques, and procedures proved extremely successful in March 1989 during the execution of SAND EAGLE 89-1; an exercise which mirrored the soon to be executed JUST CAUSE.

⁴⁴DOD Reorganization Act. US Code, Volume 1, Sec 661, 1986.

⁴⁵Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3-56, (Initial Draft), Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, D.C., September 1992) iii.

⁴⁶Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 5-00.2 (Test Pub) Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures, (Washington, D.C., 15 June 1988) I-1.

⁴⁷United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rescue Mission Report, (1980), i.

⁴⁸Ibid., 13-52.

⁴⁹Colonel James H. Kyle, USAF (Retired), The Guts to Try, (New York, NY: Orion Books, 1990), 15-26.

Rescue Mission Report, 60.

⁵¹Major James Casey, Major Robert Fleming, Major Glen McConnell, and Major Daniel Skousen, "Conducting Short-Notice, Integrated, Conventional Air Operations in Support of a Joint Objective", (12th Air Force, Bergstrom AFB, TX: January 21, 1988), 3.

⁵²There was a concerted effort on the part of the exercise planners to ensure this exercise was as realistic as possible. Unlike previous joint exercises, participating units were not afforded an opportunity to take part in the exercises planning conferences which were used to design the operation. The lowest level briefings which occurred were at the Army division commander and Air Force wing commander level. However, these individuals were not briefed until 24 - 48 hours prior to the transmission of the JCS Warning Order.

⁵³"Conducting Short-Notice, Integrated, Conventional Air Operations in Support of a Joint Objective," 17.

⁵⁴Ibid., 18.

⁵⁵Twelfth Air Force, "SAND EAGLE 89-2 After-Action Report", (Bergstrom AFB, TX: August 1989), 8.

⁵⁶At the time, this exercise was not advertised as a rehearsal for possible operations in Panama. However, in my role as the primary Army exercise planner for SAND EAGLE 89-2 and the XVIII Airborne Corps exercise branch chief for joint exercises within the SOUTHCOM AOR, the connectivity was obvious. Put the profiles of both operations side by side, and it is easy to conclude that SAND EAGLE 89-2 provided the means to rehearse the basics of JUST CAUSE nine months before execution.

⁵⁷SAND EAGLE 89-2, AFTER-ACTION Report, 65-66.

⁵⁸Quote is taken from the written transcript of remarks made during the After Action Review conducted for SAND EAGLE 89-2.

⁵⁹Larry Grossman, "Beyond Rivalry," Government Executive, June 1991, 10-11.

⁶⁰Armed Forces Staff College, AFSC Pub 2 Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1992), II-1-2.

⁶¹Ibid., II-5-A-7.

⁶²Ibid., II-5-B-1.

⁶³Ibid., II-5-C-12.

⁶⁴COL Jerome Edwards, LTC Michael Anastasio, LTC Gilbert Harper, LTC Michael Simmons, "Grenada: Joint Logistical Insights for No-Plan Operations," (National Security Program Discussion Paper, Series 89-05: 1989), vii.

⁶⁵AFSC Pub 2, II-5-D-5.

⁶⁶Major Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 285-286.

⁶⁷Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama, (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 1991), 406.

⁶⁸AFSC Pub 2, II-5-E-1.

⁶⁹Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 5-00.2 (Test Pub), Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures, (Washington, D.C., 15 June 1988) II-1.

⁷⁰Comments from the SAND EAGLE 89-2 AAR.

⁷¹United States Southern Command, "JTD Spaces by Category, Service and Grade," December 17, 1992.

⁷²USCINCPAC, "Organization and Administration of USCINCPAC Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC), (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii: 17 July 1992), 1.

⁷³Ibid., 2.

⁷⁴United States Pacific Command, "USCINCPACINST 3020.11," (17 Jul 92), p. 1-1.

⁷⁵Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume I Planning Policies and Procedures (Extract), (Washington D.C.), III-2.

⁷⁶Ibid., V-1.

⁷⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Test Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C.; 26 July 1991), III-11 - III-18.

⁷⁸USLANTCOM, "USCINCLANT Joint Task Force Policy (Draft #9)," 10 December 1992.

⁷⁹Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama, (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 1991), 101.

⁸⁰The Department of Defense, "Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress", (Washington, D.C., January 1993), 3.

⁸¹Ibid., 5.

⁸²This statement is somewhat of a paraphrase of the stated mission of the XVIII Airborne Corps which is assigned the mission of deploying anywhere in the world on short notice and winning.

⁸³United States Pacific Command, "USCINCPACINST 3020.11," 17 Jul 92, pp.2-1 - 2-2.

⁸⁴Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States," (Washington D.C., February 1993), III-2.

⁸⁵Ibid., III-3

⁸⁶Ibid., III-4.


⁸⁷Ibid., III-4

⁸⁸Ibid., III-5.

⁸⁹Ibid., III-3.


⁹⁰Jonathan M. House, "Joint Operational Problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis," Parameters (Spring 1991), 93.

Figure 1. Chain of Command, Planned Cuban Operations, as of 18 October 1962.




Source: Jonathan M. House, "Joint Operational Problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Parameters* (Spring 1991) 94.

Figure 2. Chain of Command, Planned Cuban Operations, as of November 1962.



Source: Jonathan M. House, "Joint Operational Problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Parameters* (Spring 1991) 98.

Figure 3. Relationship of COMUSC and TAC to STRICOM and LANTCOM



*Commander, Tactical Air Command, also serves as Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces, STRICOM, and as Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces, LANTCOM.


**Commanding General, U.S. Continental Army Command, also serves as Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, STRICOM, and as Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, LANTCOM.

LEGEND:

- COMMAND
- OPERATIONAL COMMAND
- STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL DIRECTION

Source: Lawrence A. Yates, "Power Peak: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966." (Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS: July 1988) 58.


Figure 4. U.S. Command Relationships, 30 April 1965.



*For a short period, Maj. Gen. York commanded all land forces ashore.


Source: Lawrence A. Yates, "Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966." (Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS: July 1988) 109.

Figure 5. U.S. Command Relationships, 1 May 1965.




Source: Lawrence A. Yates, "Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966." (Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS: July 1988) 109.

Figure 6. U.S. Command Relationships, 4-6 May 1965.



Source: Lawrence A. Yates, "Power Pack: U. S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966." Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS: July 1988) 111.


Figure 7. U.S. Command Relationships, 7 May 1965.



*TF 121 AND TF 124 assumed supporting roles to the ground forces, with General Palmer authorized direct liaison with the commanders of each TF in order to levy support requirements. In December 1965, the JCS dissolved TF 121 and TF 124 and established a permanent headquarters command for all U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic.


Source: Lawrence A. Yates, "Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966." (Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS: July 1988) 112.

Figure 8. Command Structure.



Source: Major Vijay Tiwathia, *The Grenada War: Anatomy of a Low-Intensity Conflict* (India: Lancer Press, 1987) 195.

Figure 9. Sample HQ JTF Staff Organization.



LEGEND:


————— COMMAND COORD ===== SUPPORT

NOTES:

1 Special advisor to COMJTF

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 5-00.2 (Test Pub) Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures (Washington, D.C., 15 June 1988) IV-8.

Figure 10. Sample JTF Command Relationships.



LEGEND: _____ OPCOM IAW JCS Pub 2
 ===== OPCON IAW JCS Pub 2
 Service admin/logistic support
 +++++ Supporting Operations

NOTES: This figure depicts a sample JTF organization. Expect the organization of each JTF to be unique, based primarily on the mission.

- 1/ Includes COMSOCOM.
- 2/ As appropriate--forces from 2 or more Services comprise a JTF.
- 3/ Service admin/logistic support will be provided by appropriate Service component.
- 4/ Subordinate JTF (e.g., COMJTF 100).
- 5/ Single-Service force.

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 5-00.2 (Test Pub) Joint Guidance and Procedures (Washington, D.C., 10 June 1988) IV-8.

Figure 11. Time Sensitive Planning Phase Checklist.

Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase IV	Phase V	Phase VI
Situation Development	Crisis Assessment	Course of Action Development	COA Selection	Execution Planning	Execution
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Event Perception •Problem Recognition •CINCs Assessment •JCS/NCA Assessment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Increased Reporting •JCS/NCA Evaluation •NCA Crisis Decision 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •JCS Warning Order •JTF Establishment (optimal time) •COAs Developed - Major Forces - Support •JDS Databases Established •TOAs Deployment Established •Commander's Estimate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •JCS Refine and Present COAs •NCA COA Decision 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •JCS Planning and/or Alert Order •JDS Database Completed •OPORD Developed •Force Preparation •Deployability Posture Reporting •NCA Execute Decision 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •JCS Execute Order •Execute OPORDS •JDS Database Updated •Reporting

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS Pub 5-00.2 Joint Task Forces (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures. Washington, D.C., 15 June 1988, p. II-21.

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